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INTRODUCTION 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley” or “Act”),1 
was enacted in the wake of vast stock market declines and 
congressional investigations of widespread financial misstatements 
and other misconduct in American corporations and in American 
capital markets.  In many ways, the Act is the most comprehensive 
legislation to impact the federal securities laws since the 1930s.  
Senate Report No. 107-205, which accompanied the Sarbanes-Oxley 
legislation, stated: 
  The purpose of the bill [S. 2673, which largely comprised 
the Act] is to address the systemic and structural weaknesses 
affecting our capital markets which were revealed by repeated 
failures of audit effectiveness and corporate financial and broker-
dealer responsibility in recent months and years.  The bill creates 
a strong independent board to oversee the conduct of the 
auditors of public companies, and it strengthens auditor 
independence from corporate management by limiting the scope 
of non-audit services that auditors can offer their public company 
audit clients. . . . 
 The bill also requires steps to enhance the direct 
responsibility of senior corporate management for financial 
reporting and for the quality of financial disclosures made by 
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public companies.  The bill establishes clear statutory rules to 
limit, and expose to public view, possible conflicts of interest 
affecting securities analysts.  Finally, the bill authorizes 
substantially higher funding for the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.2 
The Act also provides that company audit committees are 
responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the 
work of their auditors.  The independence of company audit 
committees is strengthened by prohibiting committee members from 
accepting consulting fees from the company and by barring 
committee members from being affiliated persons of the company 
other than in their capacity as board members.  The Act prohibits 
insider trades during pension blackout periods, requires prompt 
disclosure of insider trades in company stock, lengthens the 
limitations period for securities fraud actions, establishes a new 
federal crime of securities fraud, and enacts into law a number of 
other provisions designed “to protect investors by improving the 
accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the 
securities laws.”3 
While the Act contains a number of provisions expressly 
granting private parties the right to sue for violations of the Act, there 
is an important question as to whether or not private actions may be 
implied under certain provisions of the Act.  In other words, should 
the courts imply private rights of action where such rights have not 
been granted expressly by the Act?  Conceptually, such implied 
private actions could be based upon specific existing provisions of the 
federal securities laws which already sustain implied private actions, 
such as the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act” or 
“SEA”) section 10(b)4 and Rule 10b-55 or SEA section 14(a)6 and Rule 
14a-9;7 or such implied private actions could rest solely upon the new 
statutory provisions of the Act. 
We will address the state of the existing law with respect to 
implying private actions under the federal securities laws, the 
legislative history of the Act as this legislative history addresses 
implying private actions under the Act, and, most important, the 
specific language of the Act itself as that language relates to the issue 
 
 2 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS OF THE 
UNITED STATES SENATE TO ACCOMPANY S. 2673, S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 2 (2002). 
 3 See the preamble to the Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 745 (2002). 
 4 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000). 
 5 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003). 
 6 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2000). 
 7 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2003). 
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of implying private actions under the Act.  We will also examine SEC 
rules and releases promulgated pursuant to the Act, focusing upon 
the issue of implied liabilities. 
BACKGROUND 
The expansion and contraction of the application of the concept 
of implying private actions under the federal securities laws and 
certain other statutes has been examined elsewhere in considerable 
detail.8  In this Section, we will focus briefly upon the high points of 
that analysis in order to establish the framework for the proper 
approach to implied private actions under the Act. 
In Cort v. Ash,9 the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a stockholder’s 
implied action against directors for violation of a criminal statute that 
prohibited corporate expenditures in campaigns for federal office.  A 
unanimous Court, per Mr. Justice Brennan, stated: 
 In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a 
statute not expressly providing one, several factors are relevant.  
First, is the plaintiff “one of the class for whose especial benefit 
the statute was enacted”[10]—that is, does the statute create a 
federal right in favor of the plaintiff?  Second, is there any 
indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create 
such a remedy or to deny one?[11]  Third, is it consistent with the 
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a 
remedy for the plaintiff?[12]  And finally, is the cause of action 
one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the 
concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a 
cause of action based solely on federal law?13 
Four years after Cort, the High Court changed direction, and in a 
6-3 decision in Cannon v. University of Chicago,14 implied a private right 
of action under section 901(a) of Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972, which prohibits sex discrimination by 
universities receiving federal financial assistance.  The action had 
 
 8 See 1 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, BROMBERG AND LOWENFELS ON 
SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD §§ 2:53 et seq. (2d ed. 2003). 
 9 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
 10 Id. at 78 (citing Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)). 
 11 Id. (citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 
453, 458 (1974)). 
 12 Id. (citing Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 423 (1975); Nat’l 
R.R. Passenger Corp., 414 U.S. 453; Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964)). 
 13 Id. (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U.S. 388, 394, 395 (1971); id. at 400 (Harlan, J., concurring); J.I. Case Co. v. 
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434 (1964); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963)). 
 14 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
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been brought by a female who was denied admission to medical 
school at two private universities.  For our purposes, however, the 
most significant element in the Court’s opinion, as well as in the 
concurring and dissenting opinions, was the emphasis upon the 
importance of the second Cort factor—the legislative intent—in 
comparison to Cort’s three other factors. 
Cannon’s emphasis upon Cort’s second factor—legislative 
intent—was reiterated later in the same year by the Supreme Court in 
a leading case involving the federal securities laws.  In Touche Ross & 
Co. v. Redington,15 the High Court determined that a broker’s 
customers had no implied action for damages against the broker’s 
auditors for alleged misstatements contained in the reports required 
under section 17(a) of the Exchange Act.16  The Court wrote: 
It is true that in Cort v. Ash, the Court set forth four factors that it 
considered “relevant” in determining whether a private remedy is 
implicit in a statute not expressly providing one.  But the Court 
did not decide that each of these factors is entitled to equal 
weight.  The central inquiry remains whether Congress intended 
to create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause of 
action.  Indeed, the first three factors discussed in Cort—the 
language and focus of the statute, its legislative history, and its 
purpose—are ones traditionally relied upon in determining 
legislative intent.  Here, the statute by its terms grants no private 
rights to any identifiable class and proscribes no conduct as 
unlawful.  And the parties as well as the Court of Appeals agree 
that the legislative history of the 1934 Act simply does not speak 
to the issue of private remedies under § 17(a).  At least in such a 
case as this, the inquiry ends there: The question whether 
Congress, either expressly or by implication, intended to create a 
private right of action, has been definitely answered in the 
negative.17 
Redington’s focus upon legislative intent as manifested in the 
language and terms of the statute and to a lesser degree in the 
legislative history was reemphasized in the Supreme Court’s 1994 
decision in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver.18  In 
Central Bank, the High Court refused to imply a private right of action 
for aiding and abetting securities fraud under SEA section 10(b).  
The Court’s analysis concentrated almost exclusively upon the text of 
the statute. 
 
 15 442 U.S. 566 (1979). 
 16 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (2000). 
 17 Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 575-76 (internal citation omitted). 
 18 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
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We have refused to allow 10b-5 challenges to conduct not 
prohibited by the text of the statute. 
. . . . 
 Adherence to the text in defining the conduct covered by § 
10(b) is consistent with our decisions interpreting other 
provisions of the securities Acts.  In Pinter v. Dahl, for example, we 
interpreted the word “seller” in § 12(1) of the 1933 Act by 
“looking first at the language of § 12(1).”  Ruling that a seller is 
one who solicits securities sales for financial gain, we rejected the 
broader contention, “grounded in tort doctrine,” that persons 
who participate in the sale can also be deemed sellers.  We found 
“no support in the statutory language or legislative history for 
expansion of § 12(1),” and stated that “[t]he ascertainment of 
congressional intent with respect to the scope of liability created 
by a particular section of the Securities Act must rest primarily on 
the language of that section.” 
. . . . 
 Our consideration of statutory duties, especially in cases 
interpreting § 10(b), establishes that the statutory text controls 
the definition of conduct covered by § 10(b).19 
Our conclusion from the above discussion is that the existence 
or non-existence of implied private actions under specific provisions 
of Sarbanes-Oxley must be determined by reference to the legislative 
intent.  And legislative intent is determined primarily through an 
analysis of the text and language of the statute and to a lesser degree 
through an analysis of the statute’s legislative history and purpose. 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
For reasons of organization and clarity, it is now appropriate to 
address the legislative history of Sarbanes-Oxley.  We will address the 
text and language of the statute in subsequent sections.  This 
legislative history roughly divides itself into three phases, and a 
reasonable conclusion after analysis of these phases is that this 
legislative history is not supportive of implied private actions under 
the Act. 
The first phase of the legislative history is seen in the hearings 
on February 4-5, 2002 of the House Subcommittee on Capital 
Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the 
House Committee on Financial Services.  In these hearings 
Representative Christopher Cox of California, who had been one of 
 
 19 Id. at 173-75 (internal citations omitted). 
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the most avid and vocal proponents of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”),20 moved swiftly to forestall 
any attempt to roll back this essentially pro-defendant legislation by 
spinning it as pro-plaintiff.  Mr. Cox stated: 
 I am also very pleased as we meet here today that as we try 
and pick up the pieces, as the victims of the Enron debacle try 
through both civil and ultimately criminal proceedings to gain 
vindication, that we can rely upon the very pro-shareholder 
legislation that this Congress enacted some years ago in the form 
of the Securities Litigation Reform Act, because many of the 
Members of this subcommittee, given our change in jurisdiction 
in the Congress, were not present at the birthing and the drafting 
of that legislation.  I just want to bring to the Members’ attention 
some of what it is going to do for the shareholders of Enron who 
are now seeking vindication.  In the old days it used to be that the 
first lawyers to the courthouse got to represent you in a class 
action.  We ended that abuse.  We ended that process and now 
the court is going to pick the best class representative. 
 The Securities Litigation Reform Act gives the court the 
power to review unconscionable attorneys fees so that the 
recoveries for abused shareholders will be greater.  It imposed 
new responsibilities on auditors to detect and report illegal acts.  
It eliminated the professional plaintiffs that used to victimize 
shareholders in fraudulent and extortionate lawsuits.  It 
strengthened the conflict of interest rules relating to attorneys, 
ensuring that shareholders are going to get fair representation. 
 . . .[T]he Securities Litigation Reform Act broadened the 
SEC’s aiding and abetting enforcement authority, strengthening 
the ability of the Commission to prosecute those who aid and abet 
violations of our securities laws. 
 I also wanted to point out, in conclusion, that far from 
making it more difficult to bring these kinds of lawsuits, it seems 
to have advantaged meritorious cases.  In the 5 years preceding 
the enactment of the Securities Litigation Reform Act the average 
number of securities laws fraud suits filed in our Federal courts 
was 189.  That’s increased now 250 percent, so that for 2001 the 
actual number of cases filed was 486, and the average settlements 
have gone way up . . . so that shareholders are getting more as a 
result of these important reforms.21 
 
 20 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.). 
 21 The Enron Collapse: Implications to Investors and the Capital Markets: Hearings on 
H.R. 3763 Before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored 
Enterprises of the House Committee on Financial Services, 107th Cong. (Feb. 4, 2002), 
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Representative Cox’s efforts to prevent any weakening of the 
provisions of the PSLRA were supported by statements from the 
American Enterprise Institute, the Securities Industry Association, the 
Financial Executives International, and others.  These supporting 
statements were made at the outset of the hearings on March 13, 
March 20, and April 9, 2002, before the full House Committee on 
Financial Services, which was addressing House Bill 3763, the 
Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility and 
Transparency Act of 2002.  House Bill 3763, together with Senate Bill 
2673, was subsequently enacted as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
At this second set of House hearings, however, a second phase of 
legislative history with respect to Sarbanes-Oxley emerged in the 
forceful statements of Representatives John La Falce of New York, 
Melvin Watt of North Carolina, and Brad Sherman of California 
supporting the enhancement of the rights of private litigants to 
enforce the securities laws.  Representative Watt clearly articulated 
this position. 
 So one of the things I particularly feel strongly about is that 
there is a very important role for private litigants to enforce rights 
in this context.  We can’t give responsibility solely to the SEC and 
say you have got absolute authority to do this, and if you don’t do 
it, then nobody is going to have the authority to do it.  Our whole 
accountability system in this country is based on the rights of 
individuals to hold corporations and other individuals 
accountable when they feel like they have been wronged.  So, at a 
minimum, we need to put some of those provisions in the bill to 
provide for private litigants to protect their own rights, and that I 
think is a hallmark of the way our system should work.22 
The majority of the legislators who passed Sarbanes-Oxley, 
however, did not accept this position articulated by Representative 
Watt.  The third and final phase of the congressional debates 
regarding Sarbanes-Oxley appeared to militate against the expansion 
of implied private actions under the Act.  This interpretation is 
supported by the statements of a number of Congressmen on July 25, 
2002 during the debate on the conference report on House Bill 3763, 
a report which essentially comprised the Act. 
Representative Watt and others, who had championed the 
enhancement of the rights of private litigants under the Act and who 
were now faced with a fait accompli in the final version of the Act, 
 
available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/bank/hba77683.000/ 
hba77683_0f.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2004). 
 22 Id. 
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made resigned statements emphasizing the need for future studies 
regarding civil actions, and stressing that the Act was really “just the 
first step.”23  Their conclusion appeared to be that the final version of 
the Act, whatever else it accomplished, did not do enough to 
enhance the rights of private plaintiffs in civil litigation.  
Representative Watt spoke to the need for additional studies, stating: 
 Let me applaud the chair and ranking member of the House 
Committee on Financial Services for the job they did starting the 
process.  We had a bill that was a reasonable start, that has been 
significantly improved upon during the course of the conference, 
and one of the things that the bill does is ratchet up criminal 
penalties, but I want to take some time to say that I am not sure 
that just ratcheting up criminal penalties will do the job. 
 But there are some things in the conference report which 
require us and the SEC and GAO to do additional studies and 
report back to the committees of jurisdiction about either 
regulatory action that is recommended or legislative action that is 
recommended, and one of those things is an SEC study of 
violations and violators and whether we have undermined the 
ability of individuals to bring claims in civil court to enforce their 
rights and protect their status as investors. 
 I do not want to overlook some of those studies that will be 
reporting back to us because I think this bill is really just the first 
step, and I applaud us for making that step.24 
Representative Carson of Indiana stated: 
 The Conference bill before us today provides the absolute 
minimum protections to protect investors and restore market 
confidence. 
 Still, this measure could be stronger and certainly disgorging 
the ill gotten gains of these criminals and redistributing profits to 
the victims must be the next step. 
 We hear frequently that there is little that Congress should 
do and limit our interference.  However, Congress’ passage of the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 got us to where 
we are today.  It repealed the civil RICO, thereby preventing 
defrauded investors from obtaining triple damages when they 
bring securities fraud claims. 
 Mr. Speaker, if we are to restore market confidence, and 
investors and workers are to be made whole, Congress must pass a 
strong bill that sets penalties, protects whistleblowers, sends 
 
 23 148 CONG. REC. H5465 (daily ed. July 25, 2002). 
 24 Id. 
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wrongdoers to jail, and ensures transparency. 
 Assets acquired through fraud and betrayal of confidence 
should not be allowed to stand when countless Americans close to 
retirement must now rethink how they will downgrade their 
retired lives.25 
Representative Conyers of Michigan emphasized: 
 As good as this bill is, it’s important to note that the 
agreement is just a first step toward protecting American investors 
and workers.  We still need to fix the many, many giveaways 
enacted by Congress in the 1995 Securities Litigation bill.  For 
example, we need to restore civil liability against those that aid 
and abet securities fraud violators, and make sure that civil RICO 
applies in full to securities fraud.  Measures such as this will make 
it abundantly clear that we will not tolerate future Enron or 
WorldCom situations.26 
Representative Tiahrt of Kansas concluded: 
 One important area which this bill does not address is the 
issue of returning ill-gotten corporate gains to investors.  I believe 
Congress must act to ensure that investors are able to reclaim 
their losses which are due to corporate fraud.27 
THE TEXT OF SARBANES-OXLEY 
We concluded above that the U.S. Supreme Court has mandated 
that the existence or non-existence of implied private actions under 
Sarbanes-Oxley must be determined by reference to the legislative 
intent.  And legislative intent is determined primarily through an 
analysis of the text and language of the statute and to a lesser degree 
through an analysis of the statute’s legislative history.  We also 
concluded that the legislative history is not supportive of implied 
private actions under Sarbanes-Oxley. 
We now turn to an analysis of the text and language of certain 
provisions of the statute.  Certain provisions by their terms clearly 
reject the implication of private actions.  Other provisions 
inferentially reject the implication of private actions.  Still other 
provisions are less clear in such a rejection, but the impact and thrust 
of the text is toward rejection of implied private actions.  We will 
commence our analysis with those provisions which clearly reject the 
implication of private actions, and move across the spectrum to those 
provisions which are less clear in their rejection. 
 
 25 Id. at H5470. 
 26 Id. at H5478. 
 27 Id. 
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There are two additional considerations which are embedded in 
our analysis.  First, any private actions implied under Sarbanes-Oxley 
may be based upon specific existing provisions of the federal 
securities laws, which already sustain implied private actions, such as 
SEA section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5; alternatively, such implied private 
actions may rest solely upon the new statutory provisions of Sarbanes-
Oxley.  Second, what weight should be given to SEC releases and 
rules promulgated under specific provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley after 
the enactment of the statute?  In some instances, such as with respect 
to the professional conduct of lawyers, the Commission has been 
careful specifically to reject any creation of implied private actions.  
In other instances, such as new Regulation G28 addressing pro forma 
financial statements, the Commission has opined that violations of 
Regulation G may also be violations of SEA section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5. 
SPECIFIC STATUTORY REJECTION OF IMPLIED PRIVATE ACTIONS 
Section 804 of Sarbanes-Oxley,29 the new statute of limitations 
for securities fraud, states clearly and unequivocally: 
(c) NO CREATION OF ACTIONS.—Nothing in this section shall 
create a new, private right of action.30 
While this statutory language is clear, simple, and unambiguous, the 
complete section 804 raises complex questions regarding implied 
private actions. 
Section 804(a) of the Act amends 28 U.S.C. § 1658, which now 
reads in full: 
Section 1658—Time limitations on the commencement of civil 
actions arising under Acts of Congress 
 (a) Except as otherwise provided by law, a civil action arising 
under an Act of Congress enacted after the date of the enactment 
of this section may not be commenced later than 4 years after the 
cause of action accrues. 
 (b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), a private right of action 
that involves a claim of fraud, deceit, manipulation, or 
contrivance in contravention of a regulatory requirement 
concerning the securities laws, as defined in section 3(a)(47) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(47)), may be 
brought not later than the earlier of— 
 
 28 17 C.F.R. §§ 244.100-.102 (2003). 
 29 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (2003). 
 30 Id. 
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 (1) 2 years after the discovery of the facts constituting 
the violation; or 
 (2) 5 years after such violation.31 
In addition to amending 28 U.S.C. § 1658, section 804 further 
provides: 
 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The limitations period provided by 
section 1658(b) of title 28, United States Code, as added by this 
section, shall apply to all proceedings addressed by this section 
that are commenced on or after the date of enactment of this Act. 
 (c) NO CREATION OF ACTIONS.—Nothing in this section 
shall create a new, private right of action.32 
There may be a certain conflict among the sections quoted 
above.  Generally speaking, section 804 extends the pre-Sarbanes-
Oxley statutes of limitations applicable to claims of fraud under the 
federal securities laws from one year after the discovery of the facts 
constituting the violation but no more than three years after the 
violation, to two years after discovery but no more than five years after 
the violation.  In addition, section 804 applies to all fraud claims 
under the federal securities laws commenced after the enactment of 
Sarbanes-Oxley.  Thus, for example, a securities fraud claim which 
accrued four years prior to the enactment of the statute and was 
therefore barred at the time of enactment by the three year pre-
enactment statute of limitations, could be revived and commenced 
after enactment unless such revival is deemed to “create a new, 
private right of action” under 804(c). 
Another example of clear statutory rejection of implied private 
actions under Sarbanes-Oxley appears in section 303,33 which 
prohibits improper influence on the conduct of audits. Section 
303(b) states unequivocally: 
ENFORCEMENT.—In any civil proceeding, the Commission shall 
have exclusive authority to enforce this section and any rule or 
regulation issued under this section.34 
While the above language is clear and unambiguous, the full 
section may raise questions with respect to implied private actions.  
Section 303 states in full: 
 (a) RULES TO PROHIBIT.—It shall be unlawful, in 
contravention of such rules or regulations as the Commission 
 
 31 Id. 
 32 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 804, 116 Stat. 745, 801 
(2002). 
 33 15 U.S.C. § 7242(b) (2003). 
 34 Id. 
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shall prescribe as necessary and appropriate in the public interest 
or for the protection of investors, for any officer or director of an 
issuer, or any other person acting under the direction thereof, to 
take any action to fraudulently influence, coerce, manipulate, or 
mislead any independent public or certified accountant engaged 
in the performance of an audit of the financial statements of that 
issuer for the purpose of rendering such financial statements 
materially misleading. 
 (b) ENFORCEMENT.—In any civil proceeding, the 
Commission shall have exclusive authority to enforce this section 
and any rule or regulation issued under this section. 
 (c) NO PREEMPTION OF OTHER LAW.—The provisions 
of subsection (a) shall be in addition to, and shall not supercede 
or preempt, any other provision of law or any rule or regulation 
issued thereunder. 
 (d) DEADLINE FOR RULEMAKING.—The Commission 
shall— 
 (1) propose the rules or regulations required by this 
section, not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this 
Act; and 
 (2) issue final rules or regulations required by this 
section, not later than 270 days after that date of enactment.35 
 
While the SEC may have exclusive authority to enforce this 
section under subsection (b) above, subsection (c) would appear to 
allow a private party to initiate an implied private action based upon 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to seek redress for conduct 
denominated as fraudulently manipulative or misleading under 
subsection (a). 
There are two additional points worth noting in addressing 
specific statutory rejections of implied private actions under 
Sarbanes-Oxley.  First, section 409, which requires real-time 
disclosure by issuers of material changes in operations, initially 
provided that only the SEC could enforce section 409 in a civil 
action.36  The Sarbanes-Oxley Conference Committee, however, chose 
to drop this requirement prior to the statute’s enactment.  Second, 
section 305 provides that in any action initiated by the SEC “the 
Commission may seek, and any federal court may grant, any equitable 
relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of 
 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. § 78m. 
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investors.”37  Since this provision would appear to cover financial, as 
well as other redress, it adds additional strength to the argument that 
implied private actions are not necessary to make investors whole 
under Sarbanes-Oxley. 
EXPRESS ACTIONS NEGATE IMPLIED ACTIONS 
Moving across the spectrum from sections 804 and 303 of 
Sarbanes-Oxley, which by their specific terms reject implied private 
actions, we address two statutory sections of the Act that provide for 
express private actions in the event of their violation.  The clear 
inference from the provision of an express statutory private action for 
the violation of a particular section of the Act is the negation of an 
implied private action for a violation of that same section. 
Section 306 of Sarbanes-Oxley prohibits the directors and 
executive officers of an issuer from purchasing or selling any equity 
security of the issuer during a pension plan blackout period that 
temporarily prevents plan participants from engaging in equity 
securities transactions through their plan accounts.38  These 
restrictions apply if the director or executive officer acquired his 
security in connection with his services as a director or executive 
officer.  If this prohibition is violated, the statute specifically provides: 
(2) REMEDY.— 
 (A) IN GENERAL.—Any profit realized by a director or 
executive officer referred to in paragraph (1) from any purchase, 
sale, or other acquisition or transfer in violation of this subsection 
shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any 
intention on the part of such director or executive officer in 
entering into the transaction. 
 (B) ACTIONS TO RECOVER PROFITS.—An action to 
recover profits in accordance with this subsection may be 
instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent 
jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the 
issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer fails or 
refuses to bring such action within 60 days after the date of 
request, or fails diligently to prosecute the action thereafter, 
except that no such suit shall be brought more than 2 years after 
the date on which such profit was realized.39 
In addition to the express statutory text, Exchange Act Release No. 
 
 37 Id. § 78u(d)(5). 
 38 Id. § 7244. 
 39 15 U.S.C. § 7244. 
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34-47225,40 which promulgated rules under section 306, gives no hint 
of any authorization for an implied private action. 
Section 806 of Sarbanes-Oxley provides federal protection to 
employees of public companies when they act lawfully to disclose 
information about fraudulent activities within their company.41  If the 
employer does take illegal action against the whistleblower in 
retaliation for lawful and protected conduct, section 806 specifically 
authorizes the whistleblower to file a complaint with the Department 
of Labor.  If the Department does not resolve the matter within 180 
days, the whistleblower is authorized to commence an action in 
federal court.  Section 806 specifically sets out the procedure that a 
whistleblower must follow to institute a federal action, the burden of 
proof, the statute of limitations, and the permissible damages. 
As with respect to section 303 discussed above, however, section 
806(d) provides: 
 (d) RIGHTS RETAINED BY EMPLOYEE.—Nothing in this 
section shall be deemed to diminish the rights, privileges, or 
remedies of any employee under any Federal or State law, or 
under any collective bargaining agreement.42 
Arguably, this provision may authorize an implied private action 
under state or federal law for conduct violative of section 806 when 
such conduct also violates other laws. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS ADVERSELY IMPACTING IMPLIED                
PRIVATE ACTIONS 
Continuing our move across the spectrum from statutory 
provisions of the Act which by their specific terms reject implied 
private actions, to statutory provisions which provide for express 
private actions thereby inferentially negating implied private actions, 
we now address statutory provisions whose thrust and impact is 
against implied private actions. 
Perhaps the most fundamental reform introduced by Sarbanes-
Oxley is the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board.  The Board is carefully organized to be both independent of 
the accounting industry and subject to supervision by the SEC.  
Congress provided funding for the Board by imposing fees on public 
companies and granted the Board broad powers to set auditing, 
quality control, and ethical standards for accounting firms that audit 
 
 40 Insider Trades During Blackout Periods, Exchange Act Release No. 47225, 
[2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) ¶ 86,817 (Jan. 22, 2003). 
 41 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2003). 
 42 Id. 
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public companies.  In addition, under the Act, the Board has 
authority to inspect, investigate, and bring disciplinary proceedings 
against these accounting firms. 
As part of its responsibilities, the Board is directed to conduct a 
continuing program of inspections of registered public accounting 
firms to assess the degree of compliance by these firms with the Act, 
the rules of the SEC and the Board, and professional standards in 
connection with the performance of audits and related matters 
involving issuers.  The Board is directed to prepare a written report of 
its findings for each inspection and make this report available to the 
public, 
except that no portions of the inspection report that deal with 
criticisms of or potential defects in the quality control systems of 
the firm under inspection shall be made public if those criticisms 
or defects are addressed by the firm, to the satisfaction of the 
Board, not later than 12 months after the date of the inspection 
report.43 
The thrust and impact of this rather unusual provision will be adverse 
to the initiation and prosecution of implied private actions because it 
will deny to plaintiffs’ lawyers the very type of official findings adverse 
to accounting firms which are the lifeblood of their lawsuits. 
Another provision of the Act dealing with accounting firms 
whose thrust and impact is against implied private actions is section 
106(a)(1), which states: 
 (a) APPLICABILITY TO CERTAIN FOREIGN FIRMS.— 
 (1) IN GENERAL.—Any foreign public accounting firm 
that prepares or furnishes an audit report with respect to any 
issuer, shall be subject to this Act and the rules of the Board and 
the Commission issued under this Act, in the same manner and to 
the same extent as a public accounting firm that is organized and 
operates under the laws of the United States or any State, except 
that registration pursuant to section 102 shall not by itself provide a basis 
for subjecting such a foreign public accounting firm to the jurisdiction of 
the Federal or State courts, other than with respect to controversies between 
such firms and the Board.44 
Since almost all lawsuits asserting implied private actions under the 
federal securities laws are based upon provisions of the Exchange Act, 
most particularly section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and since, under 
section 27 of the Exchange Act, the federal courts have exclusive 
 
 43 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 104(g)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 7214(g)(2) (2003). 
 44 Id. § 7216(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
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jurisdiction of these implied private actions,45 section 106(a)(1) of 
Sarbanes-Oxley with its limitations upon jurisdiction will make it 
substantially more difficult to initiate implied private actions against 
foreign accounting firms. 
SEC RULES AND RELEASES 
In the absence of further manifestations of legislative intent 
regarding implied private actions in the language and text of specific 
provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, we will now address certain SEC rules 
and releases promulgated under this statute.  Clearly, these rules and 
releases differ from the legislative history and the text of the statute 
analyzed above because these rules and releases were promulgated 
after, not before, the enactment of the statute.  Therefore, these SEC 
pronouncements do not constitute manifestations of legislative 
intent.  Rather, they express the SEC’s interpretations of legislative 
intent or, more realistically, what the agency wants the world to 
believe was the legislative intent.  However, as the federal agency with 
the most direct statutory mandate to protect the investing public 
through the interpretation, implementation, and enforcement of the 
federal securities laws, which now include Sarbanes-Oxley, the 
agency’s interpretations of this statute are entitled to substantial 
analysis and to substantial weight. 
As in our analysis of the text of Sarbanes-Oxley, we will first 
address those SEC rules and releases which clearly reject the 
implication of private actions, and then move across the spectrum to 
address those SEC rules and releases which in one instance straddle 
the issue and in three other instances appear to support implied 
private actions. 
IMPLIED PRIVATE ACTIONS AGAINST LAWYERS 
Section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley provides rules of professional 
responsibility for attorneys. 
 Section 307.—RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ATTORNEYS. 
 Not later than 180 days after the enactment of this Act, the 
Commission shall issue rules, in the public interest and for the 
protection of investors, setting forth minimum standards of 
professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing 
before the Commission in any way in the representation of 
issuers, including a rule— 
 
 45 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2000). 
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 (1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a 
material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or 
similar violation by the company or any agent thereof, to the chief 
legal counsel or the chief executive officer of the company (or the 
equivalent thereof); and 
 (2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately 
respond to the evidence (adopting, as necessary, appropriate 
remedial measures or sanctions with respect to the violation), 
requiring the attorney to report the evidence to the audit 
committee of the board of directors of the issuer or to another 
committee of the board of directors comprised solely of directors 
not employed directly or indirectly by the issuer, or to the board 
of directors.46 
The text of the statute is silent regarding implied private actions.  
Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act” or “SA”) Release No. 8150,47 
however, which proposed a rule pursuant to section 307 that would 
establish standards of professional conduct for attorneys, was 
unequivocal in its rejection of implied private actions.  The SEC 
release invoked legislative history to buttress its position, stating: 
 The Commission notes that nothing in Section 307 creates a 
private right of action against an attorney.  Indeed, statements by 
sponsors of the provision unequivocally demonstrate that there 
was never an intention to create a right of action by third parties 
for violation of the rule.  Similarly, the Commission does not 
intend that the provisions of Part 205 create any private right of 
action against an attorney based on his or her compliance or non-
compliance with its provisions.48 
The SEC’s final release adopting the attorney responsibility rule 
emphasized that it protected not only attorneys, but law firms and 
issuers as well. 
Section 205.7 No Private Right of Action 
 (a) Nothing in this part is intended to, or does, create a 
private right of action against any attorney, law firm, or issuer 
based upon compliance or noncompliance with its provisions. 
 (b) Authority to enforce compliance with this part is vested 
 
 46 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2003). 
 47 Attorney Conduct Proposals, Securities Act Release No. 33-8150, [2002-2003 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,802, at 85,513 (Nov. 21, 2002). 
 48 Id. at 86,553 (footnote omitted) (citing 148 CONG. REC. S6552 (daily ed. July 
10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards) (“Nothing in this bill gives anybody a right to 
file a private lawsuit against anybody.  The only people who can enforce this 
amendment are the people at the SEC.”); 148 CONG. REC. S6555 (daily ed. July 10, 
2002) (statement of Sen. Enzi) (“[T]his amendment creates a duty of professional 
conduct and does not create a right of action by third parties.”)). 
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exclusively in the Commission. 
 In the proposing release, the Commission expressed its view 
that: “nothing in Section 307 creates a private right of action 
against an attorney. . . .  Similarly, the Commission does not 
intend that the provisions of Part 205 create any private right of 
action against an attorney based on his or her compliance or non-
compliance with its provisions.”  Nevertheless, the Commission 
requested comments on whether it should provide in the final 
rule “a ‘safe harbor’ from civil suits” for attorneys who comply 
with the rule.  Numerous commentators agreed that the final rule 
should contain such a provision. 
  Several commentators suggested that the final rule contain a 
safe harbor similar to that provided for auditors in Section 10A(c) 
of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78j-1(c), which provides that “[n]o 
independent public accountant shall be liable in a private action 
for any finding, conclusion, or statement expressed in a report” to 
the Commission made by an issuer whose auditor has reported to 
its board a failure to take remedial action.  Other commentators 
recommended that the Commission adopt language similar to 
that in the Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers, 
Standards of Care § 52, which provides that “[p]roof of a violation 
of a rule or statute regulating the conduct of lawyers . . . does not 
give rise to an implied cause of action for professional negligence 
or breach of fiduciary duty. . . .”  And others noted that the ABA 
Model Rules, Scope, & 20, provides that “[v]iolation of a Rule 
should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer nor 
should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty 
has been breached.”  Finally, numerous other commentators were 
of the view that a safe harbor should be created to protect lawyers 
from liability where they have attempted in good faith to comply 
with this part. 
 The Commission is persuaded that it is appropriate to 
include an express safe harbor provision in the rule, which is set 
forth in new Section 205.7, No Private Right of Action.  Paragraph 
(a) makes it clear that Part 205 does not create a private cause of 
action against an attorney, a law firm or an issuer, based upon 
their compliance or non-compliance with the part.  The 
Commission is of the view that the protection of this provision 
should extend to any entity that might be compelled to take 
action under this part; thus it extends to law firms and issuers.  
The Commission is also of the opinion that, for the safe harbor to 
be truly effective, it must extend to both compliance and non-
compliance under this part. 
 Paragraph (b) provides that only the Commission may 
enforce the requirements of this part.  The provision is intended 
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to preclude, among other things, private injunctive actions 
seeking to compel persons to take actions under this part and 
private damages actions against such persons.  Once again, the 
protection extends to all entities that have obligations under this 
part.49 
IMPLIED PRIVATE ACTIONS AGAINST AUDIT COMMITTEE             
FINANCIAL EXPERTS 
Section 407 of Sarbanes-Oxley authorizes rules with respect to 
“audit committee financial experts.” 
 Section 407. DISCLOSURE OF AUDIT COMMITTEE 
FINANCIAL EXPERT. 
 (a) RULES DEFINING “FINANCIAL EXPERT”.—The 
Commission shall issue rules, as necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest and consistent with the protection of investors, to 
require each issuer, together with periodic reports required 
pursuant to section 13(a) and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, to disclose whether or not, and if not, the reasons 
therefore, the audit committee of that issuer is comprised of at 
least 1 member who is a financial expert, as such term is defined 
by the Commission. 
 (b) CONSIDERATIONS.—In defining the term “financial 
expert” for purposes of subsection (a), the Commission shall 
consider whether a person has, through education and 
experience as a public accountant or auditor or a principal 
financial officer, comptroller, or principal accounting officer of 
an issuer, or from a position involving the performance of similar 
functions— 
 (1)an understanding of generally accepted accounting 
principals and financial statements; 
 (2)experience in— 
 (A) the preparation or auditing of financial 
statements of generally comparable issuers; and 
 (B) the application of such principles in connection 
with the accounting for estimates, accruals, and reserves; 
 (3) experience with internal accounting controls; and 
 (4) an understanding of audit committee functions. 
 (c) DEADLINE FOR RULEMAKING. — The Commission 
 
 49 Attorney Conduct Proposals, Securities Act Release No. 33-8185, [2002-2003 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,823, at 87,097-98 (Jan. 29, 2003) 
(footnotes omitted). 
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shall— 
 (1) propose rules to implement this section, not later 
than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act; and 
 (2) issue final rules to implement this section, not later 
than 180 days after that date of enactment.50 
The text of the statute is silent regarding implied private actions.  
Securities Act Release No. 8177,51 however, which adopted the rules 
authorized by section 407, created a safe harbor from liability for 
audit committee financial experts. 
 5. Safe Harbor from Liability for Audit Committee Financial 
Experts 
 Several commenters urged us to clarify that the designation 
or identification of an audit committee financial expert will not 
increase or decrease his or her duties, obligations or potential 
liability as an audit committee member. A few recommended a 
formal safe harbor from liability for audit committee financial 
experts.  Unlike the provisions of the Act that impose substantive 
requirements,[FN34] the requirements contemplated by Section 
407 are entirely disclosure-based.  We find no support in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act or in related legislative history that Congress 
intended to change the duties, obligations or liability of any audit 
committee member, including the audit committee financial 
expert, through this provision. 
 In the proposing release, we stated that we did not believe 
that the mere designation of the audit committee financial expert 
would impose a higher degree of individual responsibility or 
obligation on that person.  Nor did we intend for the designation 
to decrease the duties and obligations of other audit committee 
members or the board of directors.  We continue to believe that it 
would adversely affect the operation of the audit committee and 
its vital role in our financial reporting and public disclosure 
system, and systems of corporate governance more generally, if 
courts were to conclude that the designation and public 
identification of an audit committee financial expert affected 
such person’s duties, obligations or liability as an audit committee 
member or board member.  We find that it would be adverse to 
the interests of investors and to the operation of markets and 
therefore would not be in the public interest, if the designation 
and identification affected the duties, obligations or liabilities to 
which any member of the company’s audit committee or board is 
 
 50 15 U.S.C. § 7265 (2003). 
 51 Sarbanes-Oxley Act Disclosures, Securities Act Release No. 33-8177, [2002-2003 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,818, at 86,883 (Jan. 23, 2003). 
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subject.  To codify this position, we are including a safe harbor in 
the new audit committee disclosure item to clarify that: 
• A person who is determined to be an audit committee 
financial expert will not be deemed an “expert” for any 
purpose, including without limitation for purposes of 
Section 11 of the Securities Act, as a result of being 
designated or identified as an audit committee financial 
expert pursuant to the new disclosure item; 
• The designation or identification of a person as an 
audit committee financial expert pursuant to the new 
disclosure item does not impose on such person any 
duties, obligations or liability that are greater than the 
duties, obligations and liability imposed on such person 
as a member of the audit committee and board of 
directors in the absence of such designation or 
identification; and 
• The designation or identification of a person as an 
audit committee financial expert pursuant to the new 
disclosure item does not affect the duties, obligations or 
liability of any other member of the audit committee or 
board of directors. 
 This safe harbor clarifies that any information in a 
registration statement reviewed by the audit committee financial 
expert is not “expertised” unless such person is acting in the 
capacity of some other type of traditionally recognized expert.  
Similarly, because the audit committee financial expert is not an 
expert for purposes of Section 11, he or she is not subject to a 
higher level of due diligence with respect to any portion of the 
registration statement as a result of his or her designation or 
identification as an audit committee financial expert. 
 In adopting this safe harbor, we wish to emphasize that all 
directors bear significant responsibility.  State law generally 
imposes a fiduciary duty upon directors to protect the interests of 
a company’s shareholders.  This duty requires a director to 
inform himself or herself of relevant facts and to use a “critical 
eye” in assessing information prior to acting on a matter.[52]  Our 
new rule provides that whether a person is, or is not, an audit 
committee financial expert does not alter his or her duties, 
obligations or liabilities.  We believe this should be the case under 
federal and state law. 
[FN34] For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires the 
Commission to direct the self-regulatory organizations by rule to 
 
 52 See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
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mandate the independence of all audit committee members of 
companies listed on national securities exchanges and 
associations.  See Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  As 
another example, Section 402 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act prohibits 
certain loans made by companies to their directors and executive 
officers.53 
 
There are two points in the above excerpt which bear on the 
issue of implied private actions under Sarbanes-Oxley.  First, the SEC 
makes the distinction between provisions of the Act that impose 
“substantive requirements,” which, according to the Commission in 
footnote thirty-four of the above quote, include prohibitions of 
certain loans by companies to insiders and self-regulatory rules 
mandating the independence of all audit committee members, as 
contrasted to the provisions of section 407 which, according to the 
Commission in the first paragraph of the above excerpt, are “entirely 
disclosure-based.”  The Commission then opines that Congress did 
not intend “to change the duties, obligations or liability of any audit 
committee members, including the audit committee financial expert, 
through [section 407].”  The implication appears to be that Congress 
did intend to change certain existing duties, obligations, and 
liabilities through the imposition of the “substantive requirements” of 
the Act.  In the absence of express liabilities, one way to effectuate 
this change would be through the creation of implied liabilities for 
violations of these newly imposed “substantive requirements” of the 
Act. 
The second point in the quoted excerpt which bears on the issue 
of implied private actions under Sarbanes-Oxley is that the SEC’s safe 
harbor purports to protect the “audit committee financial expert” 
from liabilities not only under federal law but under state law as well.  
Query as to whether the SEC, as contrasted to the U.S. Congress, has 
the power to grant absolution from liabilities under state law. 
IMPLIED PRIVATE ACTIONS BASED UPON DISCLOSURE                                 
OF OFF-BALANCE SHEET TRANSACTIONS 
Section 401(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley mandates disclosure with 
respect to off-balance sheet transactions. 
 (j) OFF-BALANCE SHEET TRANSACTIONS.—Not later 
than 180 days after the date of enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002, the Commission shall issue final rules providing that 
 
 53 Sarbanes-Oxley Act Disclosures, supra note 51, at 86,893-94 & n.34 (footnotes 
omitted). 
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each annual and quarterly financial report required to be filed 
with the Commission shall disclose all material off-balance sheet 
transactions, arrangements, obligations (including contingent 
obligations), and other relationships of the issuer with 
unconsolidated entities or other persons, that may have a material 
current or future effect on financial condition, changes in 
financial condition, results of operations, liquidity, capital 
expenditures, capital resources, or significant components of 
revenues or expenses.54 
Here again, as with respect to lawyers and audit committee 
financial experts discussed above, the text of the statute is silent 
regarding implied private actions.  Securities Act Release No. 8182,55 
however, which adopted the rules authorized by section 401(a), 
created “a new safe harbor” to “protect forward-looking statements 
against private legal actions that are based on allegations of a material 
misstatement or omission.”56  The SEC appears to have designed its 
rule amendments to have a coverage and impact beyond the existing 
statutory safe harbors contained in Securities Act section 27A57 and 
Exchange Act section 21E.58  The Commission emphasized in Release 
8182, which created the new safe harbor via rule amendments: 
 Because we believe that it would promote more meaningful 
disclosure, we are invoking rulemaking authority under Sections 
[SA]27A and [SEA]21E to create a new safe harbor to ensure the 
application of the statutory safe harbors to the forward-looking 
statements required under the amendments [to SEC rules 
adopted by this Release].  The safe harbor is designed to remove 
possible ambiguity about whether the statutory safe harbors would 
apply to the forward-looking statements made in response to the 
amendments.  The safe harbor specifies that, except for historical 
facts, the disclosure would be deemed to be a “forward looking 
statement” as that term is defined in the statutory safe harbors.  In 
addition, with respect to the MD&A discussion of off-balance 
sheet arrangements, we are adopting a provision that the 
“meaningful cautionary statements” element of the statutory safe 
harbors will be satisfied if a registrant satisfies all of its off-balance 
sheet arrangements disclosure requirements.  Because the new 
MD&A safe harbor is closely linked to the statutory safe harbors, 
we urge companies preparing their disclosure to consider the 
 
 54 15 U.S.C. § 78m(j) (2003). 
 55 Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements, Securities Act Release No. 33-8182, [2002-
2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,821, at 86,969 (Jan. 28, 2003). 
 56 Id. at 86,985-86. 
 57 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (2003). 
 58 Id. § 78u-5. 
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terms, conditions and scope of the statutory safe harbors in 
drafting their disclosure.59 
IMPLIED PRIVATE ACTIONS BASED UPON ANALYSTS’ CERTIFICATIONS 
Moving across the spectrum from those SEC rules and releases 
which provide specific safe-harbor protection from implied private 
actions under provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley for lawyers, audit 
committee financial experts, and with respect to off-balance 
transactions, we now address the SEC’s attempt to straddle the issue 
of implied private actions with respect to research analysts’ 
certifications in new Regulation AC.60 
Section 501(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley authorizes the SEC, or the self-
regulatory organizations (“SROs”) under the direction of the SEC, to 
adopt rules “reasonably designed to address conflicts of interest that 
can arise when securities analysts recommend equity securities in 
research reports and public appearances.”61  One important objective 
of this statutory mandate is for rules to eliminate certain pressures on 
securities analysts from investment bankers that tend to compromise 
the objectivity of the analyst’s work.  Another important goal is for 
rules to provide disclosure to investors of certain conflicts of interest 
that could also influence the objectivity of the analyst in preparing a 
research report.  Senator Sarbanes summarized these problems 
succinctly in the debates preceding the enactment of the statute 
which bears his name. 
[I]f you are an investor and an analyst is making a 
recommendation and he puts up front in his analysis that he owns 
the company stock, or that he is receiving compensation from the 
company, or that his firm has a client relationship with the 
company, or that he is receiving compensation based on 
investment banking revenues received from the company, 
someone is going to look at this and say: wait a second. I have to 
take his recommendation in the context of his involvement.62 
The text of the statute is silent with respect to implied private 
actions, and there is no parroting of 10b-5 language as we see below 
with respect to officers’ certifications and Regulation G.63  Securities 
Act Release No. 8193,64 which adopted Regulation AC65 pursuant to 
 
 59 Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements, supra note 55, at 86,986 (footnotes omitted). 
 60 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.500-.505 (2003). 
 61 15 U.S.C. § 78o-6 (2003). 
 62 148 CONG. REC. S6333 (daily ed. July 8, 2002) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes). 
 63 17 C.F.R. §§ 244.100-.102 (2003). 
 64 Regulation Analyst Certification, Securities Act Release No. 33-8193, [2002-
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the authority granted in section 501, appears somewhat ambiguous 
with respect to implied private actions under Regulation AC. 
 I. Regulation AC and Fraud Liability Under Federal 
Securities Laws 
 Several commenters requested that the Commission 
reiterate the position stated in the Proposing Release that 
Regulation AC does not impose new liability on analysts or their 
firms.[66]  Regulation AC formalizes and potentially adds rigor to 
analysts’ responsibilities to express their views truthfully and 
without guile.[67]  Regulation AC makes explicit the 
representations that are already implicit when an analyst 
publishes his or her views—that the analysis of a security 
published by the analyst reflects the analyst’s honestly held 
views.[68] 
  Regulation AC does not alter any other existing obligation 
under the federal securities laws for research analysts or broker-
dealers.[69]  A research report contains an inherent 
representation that the views expressed in the report are not 
knowingly false and do not omit material facts necessary in order 
to make statements made not misleading.[70] 
 Thus, even without Regulation AC, analysts may be found to 
have violated the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities 
laws if they make baseless recommendations or recommendations 
 
2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,833, at 87,233 (Feb. 20, 2003). 
 65 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.500-.505 (2003). 
 66 Regulation Analyst Certification, supra note 64, at 87,241-42 n.52 (listing 
examples). 
 67 Id. at 87,242 n.53 (stating that “[a]s the Commission stated in the Proposing 
Release, Regulation AC is not intended to create new duties under Section 10(b) of 
the Exchange Act.  As a result, no private liability will arise from a broker, dealer, or 
associated person’s failure to make the required disclosure, or make, keep, and 
maintain required records.  However, Regulation AC is subject to the full range of 
the Commission’s enforcement authority.  With regard to the enforcement of 
Regulation AC by the SROs, nothing in Regulation AC is inconsistent with Exchange 
Act Rule 19g2-1,” and citing 17 C.F.R. 240.19g2-1). 
 68 Id. n.54 (stating “[t]he use of a certification process echoes and is consistent 
with one approach employed in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which requires 
certifications by officers of corporations relating to issuers’ financial statements,” and 
citing Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 302, 906, 116 Stat. 746, 
777-78, 806 (2002)). 
 69 Id. n.55 (citing, as examples, Securities Act § 17(a), (b), 15 U.S.C. 77q; 
Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. 78j(b); and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 
240.10b-5). 
 70 Id. n.56 (citing, as examples, Securities Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. 77q(a); 
Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5; Exchange Act § 15(c)(1)(A), 15 
U.S.C. 78o(c)(1)(A); and Exchange Act Rule 15c1-2(b), 17 C.F.R. 240.15c1-2). 
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that they disbelieve.71 
The SROs have been issuing rules with respect to research analysts’ 
certifications that, to some extent, are inextricably intertwined with 
the text of section 501 of Sarbanes-Oxley and the SEC rules 
promulgated thereunder.72  Query as to whether private actions may 
be implied based upon violations of these SRO rules.73 
IMPLIED PRIVATE ACTIONS BASED UPON CERTIFICATIONS                         
OF FINANCIAL REPORTS 
We have examined the safe harbors created by the SEC from 
implied private actions under certain provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley 
for lawyers, audit committee financial experts, and with respect to off-
balance sheet transactions.  We have seen the SEC straddle the issue 
of implied private actions based upon analysts’ certifications.  In 
contrast to these positions, the Commission has promulgated releases 
which support implied private actions under provisions of Sarbanes-
Oxley with respect to officers’ certifications, Regulation G, which 
covers pro forma financial statements, and accountants’ retention of 
audit records.  We now address these releases. 
Section 302(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley requires chief executive 
officers and chief financial officers personally to certify certain 
financial representations of their companies. 
 Section 302. CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
FINANCIAL REPORTS. 
 (a) REGULATIONS REQUIRED.—The Commission shall, 
by rule, require, for each company filing periodic reports under 
section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 
U.S.C. 78m, 78o(d)), that the principal executive officer or 
officers and the principal financial officer or officers, or persons 
performing similar functions, certify in each annual or quarterly 
report filed or submitted under either such section of such Act 
that— 
 (1) the signing officer has reviewed the report; 
 (2) based on the officer’s knowledge, the report does 
 
 71 Id. at 87,242 & n.57 (citing Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-45908 (May 
10, 2002); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-46301 (Aug. 2, 2002) (Proposing 
Release); Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 597 (2d Cir. 1969); In re Robertson Stephens, 
Inc., Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-11003 (Jan. 9, 2003)). 
 72 See SEC Approval of SRO Analyst Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 34-45908, 
[2001-2002 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,639, at 85,457 (May 10, 
2002). 
 73 For an extended discussion with respect to this issue, see 6 BROMBERG & 
LOWENFELS, supra note 8, §§ 13:62 to :72. 
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not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements 
were made, not misleading; 
 (3) based on such officer’s knowledge, the financial 
statements, and other financial information included in the 
report, fairly present in all material respects the financial 
condition and results of operations of the issuer as of, and for, the 
periods presented in the report; 
 (4) the signing officers— 
 (A) are responsible for establishing and maintaining 
internal controls; 
 (B) have designed such internal controls to ensure 
that material information relating to the issuer and its 
consolidated subsidiaries is made known to such officers by others 
within those entities, particularly during the period in which the 
periodic reports are being prepared; 
 (C) have evaluated the effectiveness of the issuer’s 
internal controls as of a date within 90 days prior to the report; 
and 
 (D) have presented in the report their conclusions 
about the effectiveness of their internal controls based on their 
evaluation as of that date; 
 (5) the signing officers have disclosed to the issuer’s 
auditors and the audit committee of the board of directors (or 
persons fulfilling the equivalent function)— 
 (A) all significant deficiencies in the design or 
operation of internal controls which could adversely affect the 
issuer’s ability to record, process, summarize, and report financial 
data and have identified for the issuer’s auditors any material 
weaknesses in internal controls; and 
 (B) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves 
management or other employees who have a significant role in 
the issuer’s internal controls; and 
 (6) the signing officers have indicated in the report 
whether or not there were significant changes in internal controls 
or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls 
subsequent to the date of their evaluation, including any 
corrective actions with regard to significant deficiencies and 
material weaknesses.74 
 
 74 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2003). 
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While the language of 302(a) does not expressly authorize 
private actions, that language does parrot the text of SEA section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, provisions which have engendered literally 
thousands of implied private actions during the past fifty years.  
Moreover, Securities Act Release No. 8124,75 which promulgated rules 
as directed by 302(a), offers a roadmap for the express and implied 
private actions which can be sustained based upon violations of the 
duties and obligations created by 302(a). 
 6. Liability for False Certification 
 An issuer’s principal executive and financial officers already 
are responsible as signatories for the issuer’s disclosures under 
the Exchange Act liability provisions[76] and can be liable for 
material misstatements or omissions under general antifraud 
standards[77] and under our authority to seek redress against 
those who cause or aid or abet securities law violations.[78]  An 
officer providing a false certification potentially could be subject 
to Commission action for violating Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the 
Exchange Act and to both Commission and private actions for 
violating Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Exchange Act 
Rule 10b-5. 79 
IMPLIED PRIVATE ACTIONS UNDER REGULATION G 
Section 401(b) of Sarbanes-Oxley authorizes rules with respect 
to the proper presentation of pro forma financial information, 
stating: 
 (b) COMMISSION RULES ON PRO FORMA FIGURES.—
Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Commission shall issue final rules 
 
 75 Certification of Disclosure in Companies’ Quarterly and Annual Reports, 
Securities Act Release No. 33-8124, [2002 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
¶ 86,720, at 86,125 (Aug. 28, 2002). 
 76 Id. at 86,133 n.66 (citing sections 13(a) and 18 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78m(a), 78r). 
 77 Id. n.67 (citing Howard v. Everex Systems, Inc., 228 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2000), for 
the proposition that “a corporate officer who signs a Commission filing containing 
representations ‘makes’ the statement in the filing and can be liable as a primary 
violator of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act”). 
 78 Id. n.68 (citing sections 20, 21, 21C and 21D of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§78t, 78u, 78u-3, 78u-4). 
 79 Id. at 86,133 & n.70 (footnote omitted) (noting that “[a] false certification also 
may have liability consequences under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act 
[15 U.S.C. §§ 77k and 77l(a)(2)] where a quarterly or annual report is incorporated 
by reference into a registration statement on Form S-3 [17 CFR 239.13] or F-3 [17 
CFR 239.33] or into a prospectus filed pursuant to Securities Act Rule 424(b) [17 
CFR 230.424(b)]”). 
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providing that pro forma financial information included in any 
periodic or other report filed with the Commission pursuant to 
the securities laws, or in any public disclosure or press or other 
release, shall be presented in a manner that— 
 (1) does not contain an untrue statement of a material 
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
pro forma financial information, in light of the circumstances 
under which it is presented, not misleading; and 
 (2) reconciles it with the financial condition and results 
of operations of the issuer under generally accepted accounting 
principles.80 
Here again, as with respect to officers’ certifications discussed 
above, the statutory language does not expressly authorize private 
actions.  The statutory language does, however, track the language of 
SEA section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 which have been the basis for 
thousands of implied private actions during the past half century.  
Moreover, Securities Act Release No. 8176,81 which adopted 
Regulation G82 as directed by 401(b), is quite explicit in stating that a 
violation of Regulation G may give rise to a violation of 10b-5 “if all 
the elements for such a violation are present”: 
 4. Liability matters 
 Rule 102 of Regulation G expressly provides that neither the 
requirements of Regulation G nor a person’s compliance or non-
compliance with the requirements of Regulation G shall in itself 
affect any person’s liability under Exchange Act Section 10(b) or 
Rule 10b-5 thereunder.  Disclosure pursuant to Regulation G that 
is materially deficient may, in addition to violating Regulation G, 
give rise to a violation of Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 thereunder 
if all the elements for such a violation are present.  In this regard, 
we reminded companies in December 2001 that, under certain 
circumstances, non-GAAP financial measures could mislead 
investors if they obscure the company’s GAAP results.  We 
continue to be of the view that some disclosures of non-GAAP 
financial measures could give rise to actions under Rule 10b-5.[83] 
 Section 3(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides that a 
 
 80 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2003). 
 81 Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, Securities Act Release 
No. 33-8176, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,816, at 
86,830 (Jan. 2, 2003). 
 82 17 C.F.R. §§ 244.100-.102 (2003). 
 83 Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, supra note 81, at 86,836 
n.36 (citing Financial Reporting, Release No. 33-8039 (Dec. 4, 2001); In re Trump 
Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc., Release No. 34-45287 (Jan. 16, 2002)). 
  
804 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 34:775 
violation of that Act or the Commission’s rules thereunder shall 
be treated for all purposes as a violation of the Exchange Act.  
Therefore, if an issuer, or any person acting on its behalf, fails to 
comply with Regulation G, the issuer and/or the person acting on 
its behalf could be subject to a Commission enforcement action 
alleging violations of Regulation G.  Additionally, if the facts and 
circumstances warrant, we could bring an action under both 
Regulation G and Rule 10b-5. 84 
ACCOUNTANTS’ RETENTION OF AUDIT RECORDS 
We noted above that section 104(g)(3) of Sarbanes-Oxley 
mandates confidentiality regarding certain findings made by the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board as a result of its 
inspections of accounting firms.  We noted further that this 
confidentiality requirement would adversely impact the prosecution 
of implied private actions because it would deprive plaintiffs’ lawyers 
of crucial ammunition for their lawsuits. 
By contrast, section 802(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley supports implied 
private actions by mandating that accountants who audit a public 
company’s financial statements “shall maintain all audit or review 
workpapers for a period of 5 years from the end of the fiscal period 
in which the audit or review was concluded.”85  The statute also 
provides: 
 The Securities and Exchange Commission shall promulgate, 
within 180 days, after adequate notice and an opportunity for 
comment, such rules and regulations, as are reasonably necessary, 
relating to the retention of relevant records such as workpapers, 
documents that form the basis of an audit or review, memoranda, 
correspondence, communications, other documents, and records 
(including electronic records) which are created, sent, or 
received in connection with an audit or review and contain 
conclusions, opinions, analyses, or financial data relating to such 
an audit or review, which is conducted by any accountant who 
conducts an audit of an issuer of securities . . . .86 
The Commission’s rules promulgated pursuant to section 802 
extend the record retention period from five to seven years.  
Moreover, the Commission’s Release pursuant to section 802 is quite 
clear in articulating the benefits the new record retention rules will 
provide for private litigants. 
 
 84 Id. at 86,836. 
 85 18 U.S.C. § 1520(a)(1) (2003). 
 86 Id. § 1520(a)(2). 
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 Rule 2-06 [of Regulation S-X] requires that accountants 
retain certain records relevant to an audit or review of an issuer’s 
or registered investment company’s financial statements for seven 
years.  To the extent that the rule increases the availability of 
documents beyond current professional practices, the rule may 
benefit investigations and litigation conducted by the Commission 
and others.  Increased retention of these records will preserve 
evidence reflecting significant accounting judgments and may 
provide important evidence of financial reporting improprieties 
or deficiencies in the audit process.87 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, there are a number of points worth noting.  First, 
the text and the legislative history of Sarbanes-Oxley do not support 
implied private actions under that statute.  Rather, it is the SEC rules 
and releases promulgated pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley that are the 
main source of support for such implied private actions.  Second, 
these SEC rules and releases, while supportive of implied private 
actions under Sarbanes-Oxley, are supportive of such actions within 
the framework of existing implied private actions, primarily 10b-5.  
There is no support articulated in these SEC rules and releases for 
implied private actions based solely upon the new obligations and 
duties created by Sarbanes-Oxley.  Third, the implied private actions 
that the SEC supports under Sarbanes-Oxley are the kinds of actions 
one would expect the SEC to support—to wit: actions based on false 
and misleading officers’ certifications, false and misleading pro forma 
financial statements, and baseless analysts’ recommendations.  There 
is nothing revolutionary here.  That being said, however, meaningful 
additional obligations and duties have been created by Sarbanes-
Oxley, and these additional duties and obligations will provide fuel 
for new implied private actions within the framework of existing anti-
fraud provisions.  Fourth, one of the most interesting questions with 
respect to implied private actions under Sarbanes-Oxley is whether 
the courts will imply private actions under the self-regulatory (“SRO”) 
rules presently being issued under that statute.  These SRO rules, 
which address such matters as audit committee independence and 
analyst certifications, are being issued either in lieu of, or in 
conjunction with, SEC rules, and in many cases are inextricably 
intertwined with SEC rules.  Under the language and policies 
 
 87 Audit Record Retention, Securities Act Release No. 33-8180, [2002-2003 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,819, at 86,927 (Jan. 24, 2003). 
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articulated by such authorities as Colonial Realty Corp v. Bache & Co.,88 
and Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,89 these new 
SRO rules may well provide a basis for new implied private actions. 
As a fifth consideration, it will be interesting to see how the 
lower federal courts respond to implied private actions under 
Sarbanes-Oxley.  The Supreme Court is presently embedded in the 
Contraction Era.90  The lower federal courts, however, have usually 
been more expansive with respect to implied private actions than the 
Supreme Court, and there is always the possibility of a change of 
personnel on the High Court.  Sixth, no matter what the Supreme 
Court eventually decides, however, implied private actions under 
Sarbanes-Oxley will have a settlement value, often substantial, as they 
slowly wend their way up the federal appellate ladder. 
Finally, the most receptive fora for implied private actions based 
upon Sarbanes-Oxley may well be the NASD and New York Stock 
Exchange arbitration panels, which hear and decide almost all 
customer actions against brokerage firms.  Here, the interweaving of 
the new duties and obligations created by Sarbanes-Oxley with the 
existing anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws, state legal 
provisions sanctioning fraud and negligence, and the sweeping 
ethical standards contained in SRO rules mandating that brokers 
adhere to high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable 
principles of trade, may prove very effective for plaintiffs, particularly 
in fora more receptive to equitable arguments than to strict legal 
contentions. 
 
 
 88 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966). 
What emerges is that whether the courts are to imply federal civil 
liability for violation of exchange or dealer association rules by a 
member cannot be determined on the simplistic all-or-nothing basis 
urged by the two parties; rather, the court must look to the nature of 
the particular rule and its place in the regulatory scheme, with the 
party urging the implication of a federal liability carrying a 
considerably heavier burden of persuasion than when the violation is 
of the statute or an SEC regulation. The case for implication would be 
strongest when the rule imposes an explicit duty unknown to the 
common law. 
Id. at 182; see also 6 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 8, § 13:64. 
 89 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969) (“The touchstone for 
determining whether or not the violation of a particular rule is actionable should 
properly depend upon its design ‘for the direct protection of investors.’”) (quoting 
Lewis D. Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66 COLUM. L. 
REV. 12, 29 (1966)); see also 6 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 8, § 13:65. 
 90 See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 
(1994); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 566 (1979). 
